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The Bayesian approach to statistics has been growing rapidly in popularity as an alternative to the
frequentist approach in the appraisal of heathcare technologies in clinical trials. Bayesian methods have
significant advantages over classical frequentist statistical methods and the presentation of evidence to
decision makers. A fundamental feature of a Bayesian analysis is the use of prior information as well
as the clinical trial data in the final analysis. However, the incorporation of prior information remains a
controversial subject that provides a potential barrier to the acceptance of practical uses of Bayesian
methods. The purpose of this paper is to stimulate a debate on the use of prior information in evidence
submitted to decision makers. We discuss the advantages of incorporating genuine prior information in
cost-effectiveness analyses of clinical trial data and explore mechanisms to safeguard scientific rigor in
the use of such prior information.
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The analytical appraisal of healthcare technologies is becoming increasingly important as
a means of assessing the clinical and cost-effectiveness of clinical interventions. In the
analysis of data that has been collected in a clinical trial, it is common to use frequentist
statistical methods. The frequentist approach (also known as the classical approach) is the
familiar one based on p-values, confidence intervals, and unbiased estimators. Standard
frequentist methods in cost-effectiveness analysis are based on asymptotic normality of
sample means or the nonparametric bootstrap, used to derive estimates and confidence
intervals for cost-effectiveness ratios. However, it is questionable whether the information
that has been produced has been of substantial value to decision makers in choosing between
healthcare technologies. Indeed, there is an increasing view that this may in part be a direct
result of the application of frequentist statistical methods (15), and that Bayesian methods
provide a more natural framework for quantifying uncertainty and for decision making (2).
The authors gratefully acknowledge an anonymous referee for useful comments on an earlier version of this
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782
Prior information in cost-effectiveness analysis
The arguments made in favor of the Bayesian approach are that they offer more intuitive
and meaningful inferences, that they give the ability to tackle more complex problems,
and that they allow the use of prior information in addition to the clinical trial data. These
arguments are as sound and persuasive in cost-effectiveness analysis as they are in other
fields (21).
A fundamental aspect of a Bayesian analysis is the use of prior information as well
as clinical trial data in the final analysis. In general, advocates of frequentist statistical
methods argue that prior information is intrinsically subjective and therefore has no place
in science. They point out that an unscrupulous analyst can concoct any desired result by the
creative specification of prior distributions for the parameters in the model. However, the
potential for manipulation is not unique to Bayesian statistics. The scientific community
and regulatory agencies have developed sophisticated safeguards and guidance to avoid
conscious or unconscious biases. An example is the insistence on double-blind randomized
clinical trials for the rigorous comparison of interventions. This—and similar requirements
for the statistical analysis protocol to be established before the trial begins (10)—is necessary
to obviate the potential for manipulation or bias that already exists in the use of frequentist
statistics.
In our opinion, Bayesian methods have significant advantages over classical frequen-
tist statistical methods in the appraisal of healthcare technologies and the presentation of
evidence to decision makers. In this context, the purpose of this paper is to discuss the
advantages of incorporating genuine prior information in cost-effectiveness analyses of
clinical trial data and to explore mechanisms to safeguard scientific rigor in the use of prior
information.
INCORPORATION OF PRIOR INFORMATION
A Bayesian analysis synthesizes two sources of information about the unknown parameters
of interest. The first of these is the sample data, expressed formally by the likelihood function.
The second is the prior distribution, which represents other information available to the
investigator. Whereas the likelihood function is fundamental also to frequentist inference,
the prior distribution is used only in the Bayesian approach. If we represent the data by the
symbol D and denote by θ the set of unknown parameters, then the likelihood is f (D | θ ),
the probability that data D will be observed conditional on the true value of the parameter θ .
The prior distribution is then a probability density function π (θ ), giving the probability that
θ takes any particular value based on whatever other prior information might be available
to the investigator. Bayes’ theorem synthesizes these two sources of information through
the equation:
p(θ | D) ∝ f (D | θ )π (θ ). (1)
As usual, the proportionality symbol ‘∝’ expresses the fact that the product of the likelihood
and prior density on the right side of equation (1) must be scaled to integrate to one over
the range of plausible θ values. The scaled product is then the posterior densityp(θ | D),
which expresses what is now known about θ based on both sample and prior information.
Notice that if for some value of θ the likelihood in the right side of equation (1) is small,
so that the data suggest that this value of θ is implausible, then the posterior distribution
will also give small probability to this θ value. Similarly, if for some value of θ the prior
distribution in the right side of equation (1) is small, so that the prior information suggests
that this value of θ is implausible, then again, the posterior distribution will also give small
probability to this θ value. In general, the posterior probability will be high for some θ
only when both information sources support that value. The simple and intuitive nature of
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Bayes’ theorem as a mechanism for synthesizing information is an attractive feature of the
Bayesian method.
In a cost-effectiveness analysis of a clinical trial, the data D will comprise observations
that relate to the costs and efficacies, as experienced by individual patients under the two
treatments. The parameter θ will comprise the unknown true mean costs and efficacies of
the two treatments, averaged over the whole of the relevant patient population, or perhaps
other unknown parameters from which these means may be constructed. The prior distri-
bution represents information about the distributions of costs and efficacies under the two
treatments that is available prior to (or, more generally, in addition to) observing the data D.
Using this framework, we are now able to make any inferences that we wish from the
posterior distribution representing everything that we know about the unknown parameters
in the model. If the amount of data that are available in an analysis is large, then the data
will provide the majority of the evidence and will dominate the prior distribution, in the
sense that the posterior distribution will be almost identical to the likelihood, and therefore
the posterior conclusions will be almost entirely driven by the data, rather than the prior
information. When sample sizes are much smaller and there is greater uncertainty in the
trial data, the incorporation of prior information will play a much greater role, so that the
appropriate specification of genuine prior information becomes much more critical. Genuine
prior information will discriminate between different possible values of the parameters,
since the information will suggest that some values or ranges of values are much more
likely than others. Genuine prior information will be represented by an informative prior
distribution that gives higher probability to some values than to others. This contrasts with
a Bayesian analysis using a so-called noninformative prior, which is discussed in the next
section. Genuine prior information would represent all available evidence that has been
formally synthesized into probability distributions, and there is a growing body of literature
on Bayesian methods for evidence synthesis (22).
In addition to prior information about means and variances, genuine prior information
can be structural, where we assert, for instance, that two parameters should have similar
values or that one should be larger than the other. In some situations, we may feel con-
fident about expressing structural prior information while having relatively much weaker
prior knowledge of the numerical values of the parameters. Such prior information can
nevertheless play a crucial role in the analysis, as described later.
NONSUBJECTIVE PRIOR INFORMATION
We have highlighted the main objections of subjectivity and the attendant risks of bias,
prejudice, and manipulation that have been made against the use of prior information in a
Bayesian analysis. Some authors suggest that a compromise between a fully Bayesian anal-
ysis and a frequentist approach that does not use prior information is to use a noninformative
prior distribution representing a state of prior ignorance (4). In so doing, we would obtain
some of the benefits of a Bayesian approach, particularly that the results are presented in the
intuitive way in which one would like to make inferences, without including any element
of subjectivity in the analysis.
Another suggestion, in the context where an experimental treatment is being compared
with a current or standard treatment, is to specify skeptical prior distributions for the pa-
rameters in the model (9;12). In this context, the prior distribution is specified in such a
way that it automatically favors the standard treatment. Again, it is proposed that skeptical
prior distributions should be expressed in a formalized, nonsubjective way.
Such proposals are tempting, particularly in a regulatory framework where rigorous
standards and safeguards are demanded. However, both ideas suffer from serious objections,
and both fail to exploit the full potential of the Bayesian approach.
784 INTL. J. OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT IN HEALTH CARE 18:4, 2002
Prior information in cost-effectiveness analysis
A key objection is that there is no unique way to implement either idea, and hence
subjectivity is not removed. There is a considerable body of work in the technical Bayesian
statistics literature attempting to define prior distributions to represent ignorance, known
variously as noninformative, weak, or reference prior distributions (13). For all but the
simplest situations, there is no general agreement on which formulation to use, and answers
depend on the (subjective) choice of parameterization. There can be even less agreement
over what constitutes a skeptical prior distribution. In our opinion, there are a number of
misconceptions underlying these proposals. In particular, it is simply naı̈ve to suppose that
the prior distribution in a Bayesian analysis is the only place where subjective judgments are
in danger of entering the analysis. Any statistical model, whether formulated for a frequentist
or Bayesian analysis, is a matter of subjective judgment, and it is commonplace that different
statisticians make different choices. Furthermore, the choice of which estimator, significance
test, or confidence interval to employ is a subjective matter in frequentist statistics. Such
subjectivity is reduced but not removed by the requirement that the basic form of the analysis
should be prespecified. There is no such choice to make in Bayesian statistics, since once
the posterior distribution has been obtained, there is a unique (objective) answer to any
properly specified question about the parameters. Indeed, there is a fundamental sense in
which the frequentist choice of an estimator, test, or confidence interval is comparable to
the choice of a prior distribution.
The idea of skeptical prior distributions confuses two reasons for caution in adopting
a new treatment. The first is a natural skepticism of the value of new treatments and the
possible vested interests of those proposing them. But the degree of skepticism that we feel
is not an absolute and should depend on the context. A new treatment that is well based in
accepted science will be accorded less skepticism than a new drug whose mode of action
is not fully understood. This skepticism should in fact be a natural part of the investigator’s
prior knowledge, and anyone bringing forward an analysis using genuine prior information
should demonstrate that due caution and skepticism have been exercised.
The other reason for caution, however, is the considerable cost to society that is entailed
in switching to a new treatment. Introducing a treatment that is subsequently found to be
less effective than the one it replaced will be seen as a serious error. For this reason, we
may demand a relatively high standard of proof of the value of new treatments. This is a
quite separate matter from the prior information, but concerns how we derive inferences
or decisions from the posterior distribution. Analogously, in a frequentist analysis it might
concern the choice of p-value but not the choice of test.
It is a strength of the Bayesian approach that it is possible to separate the natural
skepticism that should be a part of formulating one’s prior distribution from the caution that
should be exercised as part of decision making.
Concerning the first proposal, it is questionable whether a state of complete prior igno-
rance would ever exist. In a clinical trial comparing the cost-effectiveness of two treatments,
there must be some information available to the sponsor and the investigators that supports
the decision for further investigation, and this information is available for use in a fully
Bayesian analysis. Indeed, it should actually be regarded as wasteful not to do so.
We therefore argue that these proposals are misguided, and that where genuine prior
information exists, it should be used to maximize the information from a cost-effectiveness
analysis. The risks associated with subjectivity remain, however, and must be addressed.
This is particularly true in matters of regulation and public policy. The specification of a
prior distribution in such a context must be transparent and defensible.
The only meaningful and useful way to specify prior information is through the genuine
elicitation of prior beliefs. Similar to the requirements of a frequentist analysis, what is
required is a formal process of elicitation that is documented and justified before the study
starts. Decision makers who want to exercise further caution can do so by requiring a
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sufficiently high posterior probability that the new treatment is more cost-effective than the
standard treatment.
ADVANTAGES OF USING PRIOR INFORMATION
Clinical trials are generally powered to detect clinically relevant treatment effects and often
involve many centers across several countries. Different clinical practices across different
countries may lead to very different patterns of resource usage so that the pooling of
resource usage and cost data is not straightforward. A simple solution to this problem in
cost-effectiveness analyses is to report data from each country separately, although the
ability of the trial data to allow conclusions to be reached will now be much reduced. The
ability to incorporate prior information in a cost-effectiveness analysis is a positive benefit
of the Bayesian approach to statistical inference. It allows the analysis to make use of
all available information in addition to the clinical trial data, and hence to reach stronger,
or more generally, more realistic conclusions than would be available from a frequentist
analysis.
When designing a cost-effectiveness trial, there will always be appreciable prior infor-
mation, at least in regard to efficacy, because by the time the decision is made to conduct
such a trial at Phase III or Phase IV, there will already be other clinical trial data available.
Such data would usually be supportive of the value in continuing with the development of
the drug, or else such investment would not be made.
The prior information would almost inevitably favor the new treatment as being more
effective than the comparator and, if this information is to be utilized, a Bayesian framework
is essential. This seems to imply the opposite of the idea of a skeptical prior, where we
automatically favor the standard treatment rather than the new. The extent to which it
can be legitimate to incorporate such prior information in a formal claim of clinical or
cost-effectiveness needs to be explored. However, as we shall see later, very natural and
defensible structural information can be more influential than numerical information.
ELICITATION OF PRIOR INFORMATION
A good Bayesian analysis will incorporate genuine prior information based on all that is
known about the parameters in the statistical model. In the absence of an adequate process
for the elicitation of prior information representing genuine prior beliefs, it is reasonable to
be critical about the inclusion of prior information in an analysis.
At the present time, there is limited guidance or research on the elicitation of prior
information. The literature on elicitation techniques is small but growing, both in the context
of clinical trials (6;7;8;19) and more generally (11;17). However, there is still a need to
provide clear methodology to assist practitioners in formulating the prior distributions that
represent genuine prior information.
Given the relatively standardized process of drug development through Phases I to IV,
there may be scope for equally standardized procedures to bring forward information from
earlier phases into cost-effectiveness trials. In time, and with sound examples of Bayesian
analysis incorporating genuine prospectively elicited prior beliefs, the true value of Bayesian
methods can be demonstrated.
WHOSE PRIOR INFORMATION
The analysis of a clinical trial, whether to prove efficacy or to demonstrate cost-effectiveness,
will be presented to regulatory authorities or decision makers external to the company. In
the current environment, to present a Bayesian analysis in which the sponsor’s own prior
786 INTL. J. OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT IN HEALTH CARE 18:4, 2002
Prior information in cost-effectiveness analysis
beliefs are used to augment the trial data will, in general, not be acceptable to an external
agency.
Drug regulatory authorities generally start from a position of skepticism when reviewing
a submission for the approval of a new treatment based on safety and efficacy. The results of
a confirmatory clinical trial are expected to be robust and “to estimate with due precision the
size of effects attributable to the treatment of interest” (10). In most countries the decision
to recommend a new treatment as being more cost-effective is usually the responsibility of
agencies other than drug regulatory authorities, and is not generally the subject of formal
regulation as with drug regulatory approval. However, there is a clear movement toward
tight regulatory frameworks for cost-effectiveness that mirror those already in place for
clinical safety and efficacy (1;3;5;16).
Simple acceptance of the sponsor’s own unsupported prior opinions is clearly out of the
question. What needs to be explored is the extent to which the sponsor’s prior information,
elicited prospectively in a rigorous and transparent way, might be acceptable.
No matter how well supported the sponsor’s prior distribution may be, it seems likely
that agencies will wish to see the results of analyses of the data using other prior distributions.
So-called noninformative prior distributions have a role to play, but not for the purpose
of dismissing genuine prior information. Their role will be to help the agency to gauge
the impact of the prior information. Prior distributions that discount the sponsor’s prior
information or introduce further opinions from independent clinicians are other possibilities.
It may be that emerging guidelines will require sponsors to elicit prior information from
independent experts, who might even be nominated by the regulator.
We believe that, with the rapidly growing interest in Bayesian methods in health tech-
nology assessment, regulatory agencies need to address these questions in a dialogue with
professional statisticians in industry and academia. Indeed, it is this belief that has primarily
motivated our writing of this article.
AN EXAMPLE OF STRUCTURAL PRIOR INFORMATION
The authors have earlier presented (18) a Bayesian analysis of the U.K. data from the
multicenter TACTIC trial (20), which compared two forms of inhaler—pressurized metered
dose inhaler (pMDI) and Turbuhaler®—in the treatment of asthma.
In this analysis, we considered the simple binary efficacy outcome of whether a patient
experienced one or more exacerbations during the trial period (negative outcome) or no
exacerbations (positive outcome). Cost data were also available at the patient level. The
cost data were typically highly skewed, and it was more reasonable to assume that they
were log-normally distributed rather than normally distributed, an assumption that was
supported by simple plots of the data.
In addition, two patients in the pMDI treatment group had very high costs, although
neither patient had any exacerbations during the trial. These costs resulted in substantially
higher variances for patients in the pMDI group who did not have exacerbations, even after
a log transformation. Now, although there was no prior information about costs, we would
not expect the variances of log-costs to be very different between the two treatments or for
patients with or without exacerbations. In effect, we argued that the two extreme observations
were indicative of the highly skewed nature of costs generally, and suggested that one
might expect extreme costs in each treatment group irrespective of whether the patients
experienced exacerbations. It is possible that extreme costs only occurred for patients in the
pMDI group who did not have exacerbations purely because of random sampling, owing
to the relatively small sample sizes, and that, with larger sample sizes, extreme costs may
also have occurred in any one of the other categories. Consequently, based on this prior
belief, we formulated a prior distribution that gave generally rather weak numerical prior
INTL. J. OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT IN HEALTH CARE 18:4, 2002 787
Stevens and O’Hagan
information about the parameters but incorporated the structural information that the ratios
of variances of log-costs were likely to be reasonably close to unity.
The effect of the prior information was to shrink the posterior estimates of variance
closer together. In fact, the largest shift was in the variance of log-costs for patients in the
pMDI group who did not have exacerbations, which is where the extreme observations
were. The detailed analysis found a probability of 0.7 that Turbuhaler® is cheaper than
pMDI with weak prior information, whereas this probability moved to below 0.5 when we
added prior information about the variances of log-costs. The sensitivity of this probability
to the incorporation of the structural prior information is marked.
We conducted a further analysis using a noninformative prior distribution. In principle,
this favors neither treatment and allows the trial data to determine the posterior distribution.
In this example, however, that approach turned out to be more favorable to Turbuhaler®
than our full prior specification. The structural prior information plays a key role in this
analysis to moderate the random effect of where extreme costs fall within the data. Although
in this case it has led to favoring pMDI, because it was in the pMDI group that the extreme
costs occurred, the structural information is neutral and could just as easily have favored
Turbuhaler® had the data turned out differently.
We believe that these data and the analyses using various prior distributions offer an
important message regarding the legitimate use of prior information. Furthermore, we argue
that the appropriate analysis of these data required the use of structural prior information, and
so could only have been obtained through Bayesian methods. Similar approaches for com-
bining different sources of evidence across studies are used in Bayesian meta-analysis (22).
We emphasize here that the data analyzed in this example are not the full set of data
arising from the trial. The cost-effectiveness of Turbuhaler® was established clearly using
the Canadian data (14), which comprised the majority of all cases, so that this analysis is
for exploratory purposes only.
CONCLUSIONS
There is an increasing requirement to quantify the uncertainty associated with the cost-
effectiveness of new or established healthcare technologies. The conventional approach is
to use frequentist methods, although the Bayesian approach to statistical inference provides
a more natural framework for presenting such information. Genuine prior information can
provide more realistic conclusions, particularly where sample sizes are relatively small,
as is often the case in cost-effectiveness analyses. As we have also seen, with the use of
structural prior information we can also produce more meaningful inferences that do not
suffer from the criticism of subjectivity that is often made of Bayesian analyses.
There is still a considerable amount of research to be done on the elicitation and
specification of prior information in cost-effectiveness analyses. It is particularly important
for guidance to be developed concerning the use of Bayesian methods and genuine prior
information in the formal assessment of technologies by healthcare providers and agencies.
The transition from an academic appreciation to genuine submissions of evidence using a
Bayesian approach will only happen when there is an acceptance of the value of genuine
numerical and structural prior information. We hope that this article will stimulate a debate
on this topic and the development of formal procedures for the elicitation and incorporation
of prior information in evidence submitted to decision makers.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Bayesian methods provide a more natural framework for quantifying uncertainty and for
decision making, and there is a growing interest is using such methods in submissions of
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cost-effectiveness. A fundamental aspect of a Bayesian analysis is the use of prior informa-
tion, and decision makers should regard this as a useful contribution to the overall evidence
available to them when choosing between healthcare interventions. Guidelines should be
developed that provide recommendations for the elicitation process and the synthesis of such
information into probability distributions. Submissions of evidence on the cost-effectiveness
of new interventions using the Bayesian approach must include supporting documentation
that demonstrate clearly that a formal process of elicitation has been followed if the prior
information is to be accepted as credible. Analysts involved in cost-effectiveness submis-
sions must develop their familiarity with the Bayesian approach to statistics as well as their
skills in the elicitation of prior information.
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